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Few issues have been as persistent and recurring a 
theme as solipsism. Modern philosophy traditionally 
has managed the starting point of solipsism by trans-
lating it into a transcendental and apodictic condition 
for knowledge. Solus ipse, the contention that "I 
alone am," is reworked to exploit its most valued 
feature, the analytic clarity which the thought process 
achieves when restricted to its own operations. In 
this manner philosophy has endeavored to gain certain 
knowledge of how the mind embraces the domain of 
knowledge, the sensory world. 
As effective as transcendental thought has been in 
managing solipsism, it does not resolve problems in-
herent in the position. In emphasizing the theme of 
self-knowledge or introspection, philosophy erects a 
barrier between the mind's capacity to know, an inter-
nal process, and the world known, an external domain. 
The external world is known by means of consciousness* 
internal schemata or patterns of thought. Phil-
osophical relations which describe this process— 
inference, association, analogical apperception—all 
bear witness to the inability of consciousness to 
escape its own sphere of operations. Far from over-
coming the pitfalls inherent in solipsism, modern 
philosophy shows itself to be solipsism's most ardent 
defender; the repression of the external world in favor 
of a constituting consciousness amounts to a mere 
restatement of the solipsistic thesis. 
The motivation behind the treatment of solipsism 
discussed above is a classic one. Philosophy has 
traditionally distrusted the sensory world and the per-
ceptual process through which the world is presented to 
consciousness. In view of the limited success enjoyed 
by this approach to solipsism, it is legitimate to in-
guire whether perception merits such distrust. If not, 
is it instead the treatment which perception receives 
at the hand of transcendental exposition which prevents 
a resolution of the problem? The objective of this es-
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say is to explore the second alternative; using the 
later writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as our guide, 
we shall examine how the perceptual experience of the 
world which in the hands of transcendental analysis 
gives birth to solipsism may also offer a resolution to 
this issue. 
Let us begin by considering three categories which 
would cover most versions of solipsism. They are: 
egoistic solipsism, which defines reality as the 
disposition or behavior of the subject; epistemological 
solipsism, which states that one's immediate experience 
is primary while attempting to explore the possibility 
that knowledge itself does not owe its entire or-
ganization to a constituting consciousness; and meta-
physical solipsism, which is more radical, claiming 
that not only is one's immediate experience primary, 
but also that one cannot penetrate or go beyond such 
experience. 
Merleau-Ponty's analyses of the first two 
categories lead to a precise formulation of the 
philosophical problems which attend solipsism. He 
rejects egoistic solipsism on the grounds that the 
position can reveal nothing about the immediate 
relation of consciousness to world. The egoistic self 
is not a primary element of experience; it is rather a 
reflective reconstruction. The approach taken by 
epistemological solipsism is more promising. It argues 
that solipsism arises from the failure of philosophy 
simultaneously to account for both the primacy of 
consciousness' grasp of the world and the existence of 
a world whose structures differ from the internal ar-
rangement of consciousness. Further, notes Merleau-
Ponty, epistemological solipsism also suggests how the 
impasse found in the transcendental method may be 
overcome. A three-fold analysis is required. First, 
solipsistic consciousness must be described anew, free 
from traditional preconceptions. Secondly, the world 
must be examined for structures which differ from the 
patterns or associations of consciousness. Finally, it 
must be shown how these wordly structures are present 
or visible in consciousness' immediate grasp of the 
world. The primacy of consciousness and the uniqueness 
of the solipsistic understanding must be admitted while 
maintaining that the solipsistic grasp of immediate ex-
perience nonetheless bears the imprint of a larger ob-
jective order. 
The third category, metaphysical solipsism, under-
scores the difficulties which solipsism presents human 
expression. One of the reasons solipsism has been a 
recurring issue is because our means of expression, 
thought and speech are viewed as a unique or private 
possession of consciousness. According to the doctrine 
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espoused by a metaphysical solipsism, communication 
between consciousness is possible because they each 
participate in a shared construct, language. Language 
is a vocal and written mirror of consciousness' 
operations; it serves as a pre-established pathway 
linking these islets of expression. Once again we con-
front the problem found in epistemological solipsism; 
consciousness is the dominant partner in the 
relationship of thought to world. As a result, the 
world is reduced to an abstract domain where past and 
future stand on equal footing with the present. We 
find no conception in metaphysical solipsism of the 
world as an immediate presence participating in 
consciousness. 
There exists between epistemological and metaphys-
ical solipsism a reciprocal relationship and a mutual 
dependency upon one another. Epistemological solipsism 
proposes a new theory of knowledge. In so doing, it 
opens the possibility of a philosophical explanation of 
solipsism which avoids the antagonistic stance which 
consciousness adopts toward the world. If the theory 
of knowledge suggested by epistemological solipsism is 
valid, then it must be vindicated by experience. A 
crucial test of epistemological solipsism is its 
ability to provide an alternative to the theory of com-
munication espoused by metaphysical solipsism. The 
value of metaphysical solipsism then lies in the fact 
that it provides a testing ground where the theory of 
knowledge proposed by epistemological solipsism may be 
verified. Taken together the two descriptions offer a 
resolution to the problem of solipsism. Merleau-Ponty 
employs the three-fold analysis proposed by 
epistemological solipsism to present a new model of 
experience. He then retraces his steps to demonstrate 
how expression streams forth along the same pathways 
discovered by epistemological solipsism. 
The first step in formulating a new explanation of 
solipsism is to define anew the relation of 
consciousness to world. Merleau-Ponty formulates our 
immediate experience of the world in the following 
manner: 
The world is what I perceive, but as soon as I 
express its absolute proximity, it also becomes, 
inexplicably, irremediable distance.[1] 
Human consciousness begins as unmediated contact with 
the world; consciousness and world are 
undifferentiated. As the eyes focus upon some visible 
thing—a setting or an object—the world effaces itself 
in favor of the thing seen.[2] Consciousness applies 
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itself to what is seen and this alone commands its attention. 
In the description offered above, consciousness is 
no longer an active agent which structures the passive 
domain of the sensory world. Beneath the judgments 
made by solipsistic consciousness there is a prior 
solicitation of consciousness by the world; every per-
ceptible which becomes the object of consciousness is a 
partial image or cross-section of the world extracted 
from the perceptual order. The perceptual process is a 
conversion of the larger perceptual order into a 
situated and private perspective.[3] 
Merleau-Ponty*s theory of perception as a 
conversion process upholds the integrity of both con-
sciousness as a unique grasp of the world and the world 
as an independent structure. The solipsistic or 
private aspect of one's immediate experience arises 
from the perspectival nature of human perception. 
Merleau-Ponty insists that the uniqueness of my view of 
the world arises from the manner in which thought com-
pletes the perspectival image presented by the world. 
In order to connect one perspective to the next, 
thought executes a series of judments about the object 
seen. These judgments integrate the perspective, which 
has been uprooted from its perceptual context, into a 
new order, which is arrayed around the perceiver. 
Thought weaves a connective thread which joins one per-
spective to the next, a cohesive pattern which I 
rightly identify as mine alone. And yet, while this 
world view bears the unique stamp of solipsistic 
consciousness, the basic perspectives from which the 
solipsistic view is fashioned are carved from an in-
dependent perceptual world which subtends consciousness 
and its judgments. 
Conversion can best be understood by appealing to 
an example of the process itself. A suitable example 
may be found in the experience of watching a film. 
Each viewer in the theater has a unique understanding 
of the drama unfolding on the screen; each structures 
or interprets the film differently. However, the diff-
erent interpretations are not entirely solipsistic, for 
all interpretations draw upon the same sequence of 
settings, structures, and sounds. Every analysis of 
the film is carved from the same domain, and it is this 
common possession, this objective network of relations, 
which links all interpretations to the 'real' world. 
Any interpretation of the film is implicitly the 
measurement of the divergency between the original 
source and the subject's arrangement of that source. 
In the theater, as in perception, one never controls 
the source; in both cases there remains a vital link 
between consciousness and its source while, at the same 
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time, the source retains an independent and autonomous structure. 
In the example above, cognition, the process 
through which we arrive at judgments, is shown to be a 
secondary form of knowledge. Logically prior to the 
solipsistic sphere of cognition we find a perceptual 
consciousness which makes judgments possible. 
Perceptual consciousness is not guided by cognition; it 
takes its bearings from the logic of immediate 
experience. Consciousness has its origin in the per-
ceptual process through which the world first offers 
itself to consciousness. 
The redefinition of consciousness as an openness 
upon immediate experience indicates that the world has 
an active and original role to play in sense-
constitution. The second step in the study of 
epistemological solipsism is to examine the birth of 
consciousness within the perceptual world in order to 
learn the nature of the objective world. 
Conscious awareness of the world is achieved at 
that moment when an object crystallizes before my gaze. 
This very process, which Merleau-Ponty describes as a 
'redoubled negation', reveals a labor of the world upon 
consciousness. The initial recognition of myself as 
both a perceiver and a consciousness occurs when an ob-
ject comes into focus. At that moment, I become aware 
of myself in a negative fashion; I am not the thing 
seen—the table or the picture—since I am somehow 
removed from it. There are two steps in this process, 
an initial divergence from self which immerses the per-
ceiver in the world, followed by an immediate negation 
of the world in favor of consciousness and its manifold 
powers. This second negation, through which the world 
presents itself as a series of perspectives, explains 
the emergence of consciousness. The initial recog-
nition of myself as a conscious entity transpires when 
my distance from the object arouses within me an 
awareness of my place within the world. Self-
consciousness is gained through the perceptual interac-
tion of my sight with objects; self-consciousness is a 
temporal phenomenon. 
The birth of consciousness within the realm of im-
mediate experience affords us an insight into the world 
responsible for the very possibility of self-
consciousness. The cycle of redoubled negation is com-
pleted at that moment, described earlier, when the 
world appears to recede and the object seen commands my 
attention. The recession of the world and the 
predominance of the perspective which supercedes it is 
not an act willed nor controlled by the subject. It is 
a mistake to view perspective which alone remains when 
perception gains complete clarity as a "mental 
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representation" of the world. Since it is not my 
creation, the perception should be viewed as the end 
result of a process which owes nothing to my con-
stituting capabilities; perspectives emerge according 
to a well-defined logic of vision.[4] 
Vision is not a series of discrete perceptions, but 
rather a continued cycle of redoubled negation. For 
example, as I move around an object, one perspective 
dissolves and another emerges. The emergence is never 
abrupt, it is always a transition whereby an object— 
which, in perception, presents itself not as a substan-
tial thing, but rather as a composition of determinate 
size, shape, and color—is replaced by another such ob-
ject as my eyes shift their focus. The objects seen 
are various combinations or concatenations of these 
basic properties of the perceptual world. The meaning 
of perception is structured by the dimensions of the 
perceptual world, the properties which it contains and 
the relationship of size and color to shape. 
If the process of conversion is viewed from outside 
immediate experience, it can be seen how the indepen-
dent properties of the perceptual world not only 
provide the material or subject matter of 
consciousness, but how they also establish the very 
logic of sense-constitution. Viewed from the outside, 
the conversion of the objective properties of 
perception into perspectives is a "peeling-off" effect. 
As the perceiver moves around an object, different con-
figurations of properties coalesce into a changing 
series of perspectives. The basic patterns of sense 
which consciousness forms of the object are predeter-
mined according to the possible concatenations implicit 
within the perceptual schema of the world; by moving in 
one direction or the other, consciousness activates one 
of these objective perceptual patterns. 
When the perceptual process is viewed from within 
immediate experience, through redoubled negation, and 
from without, through the conversion theory of 
perception, a balanced view of consciousness and world 
emerge.[5] The most basic features of consciousness— 
its self-awareness and its comprehension of perceptual 
patterns—arise through the effects of the world upon 
consciousness. This dependence of consciousness upon 
the world does not jeopardize the autonomy of 
consciousness, for the meaning of the perceptual 
setting and its sense-patterns are still determined by 
the perceiver in three ways. First, and most 
basically, the meaning of the perceptual setting 
depends upon the movement of the body; traversing the 
same setting by two different routes yields two 
different sense-patterns. Secondly, the acts of judg-
ment performed by consciousness guarnatees a unique 
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description of the world. Finally, with self-
consciousness comes the ability to remember, the 
ability to remember past judgments in turn permits a 
comparison of different meaning patterns. The result 
is a consciousness capable of understanding the world 
in a more diverse and creative manner. 
The first two steps of Merleau-Ponty's analysis of 
epistemological solipsism eliminate the first barrier 
of solipsism by demonstrating, through an appeal to im-
mediate experience, that consciousness itself is not 
solipsistic, for it is organized through its exchange 
with the world. This model of experience still remains 
solipsistic, however, for within immediate experience 
the perspective is given but the objective world is 
not; the world and its meaning patterns were described 
from a position outside of perceptual consciousness. 
This is a grave difficulty, for perspectives, by their 
very nature it seems, have a very precarious and often 
suspect hold upon the world. In the third step of his 
study, Merleau-Ponty explains how immediate experience 
bears the imprint of the larger objective order from 
which our thoughts and views arise. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, others provide 
verification of the objective order within immediate 
experience. The possibility of an encounter with 
another is guaranteed by the doctrine of positionalized 
consciousness. Since consciousness is an openness upon 
the world, the perspective I have of the world is mine 
only by virtue of my position within the world. 
What I see is not mine in the sense of being a 
private world. Henceforth the table is the 
table; even the perspective views which I have of 
it and which are bound to the position of my body 
are part of being [the world] and not of myself; 
even the aspects of the table that are bound to 
my psychophysical constitution—its singular 
color if I am color-blind and the table is 
painted red—are still part of the system of the 
world.[6] 
It is possible for another to intervene in immediate 
experience because the world is not of my making. 
When I become aware of another's gaze intervening between myself and the object seen, an uneasiness tears at my solipsistic understanding of the world. The other is a silent interlocutor in immediate experience; under his gaze I become objectified. His look freezes me in space and time. As Merleau-Ponty notes, the other 
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. . . summons me to keep the promises I made when 
I admitted that I was nothing and was surpassed 
by being (the world].(7] 
Others capture from the outside the conversion of 
the world into a series of perspectives. They view the 
cohesiveness of the object seen which, under my eyes, 
disintegrates into a series of perspectives. In short, 
the other reflects back to me the interplay between my 
perspectives and the world: 
This exterior [the other] at the same time con-
firms it [my consciousness] in its particularity, 
renders it visible as partial being to the 
other's look and connects it back to the whole of 
the world.[8] 
Without speaking, the other's presence brings the 
realization that my perceptual experience is of a world 
in which he too participates. And, when he moves, in 
order to avoid the chair before me, or to pick up an 
object captured by my gaze, I gain verification of the 
connection between my perspective and the world. 
The study of epistemological solipsism is in effect 
an archeology of vision. Its three analyses amount to 
an excavation of immediate experience which uncovers an 
objective world sustaining consciousness. The new 
model of experience advanced by Merleau-Ponty shows 
consciousness to be an intersubjective rather than a 
solipsistic enterprise. 
If Merleau-Ponty's model of immediate experience 
is, as he suggests, a restatement of the very structure 
of experience, the model must be vindicated by 
experience. The study of epistemological solipsism has 
prepared the way for such a test by restricting solip-
sism to the highest sphere of consciousness, that of 
cognition. Here we rejoin the issue of metaphysical 
solipsism. While our understanding of the world issues 
from a common source, there is no guarantee that the 
means by which I understand the world (thought), and 
the means by which thought is expressed (speech), have 
any meaning for others; it is the contention of meta-
physical solipsism that thought and speech are a 
private language, an inventory of my solipsistic state. 
The final resolution of solipsism requires that thought 
and speech be shown to exist, in prototypical form, 
within immediate experience; communication must be 
traced to an origin in the objective world.[9] 
It is Merleau-Ponty's contention that the self does 
not create its own thoughts any more than it creates 
its own perceptions; thought arises through the mutual 
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involvement of the world and the perceiver within vision. 
Immediate experience holds a clue to the nature of 
thought. Consciousness does not constitute perception. 
It witnesses, through the process of redoubled 
negation, that which is perceivable from the position 
we occupy within the world; the perceptual world is a 
shared dimension. The activity of perceiving is an 
uprooting of the perceivable object from its 
surroundings. In order to perceive something, percep-
tion differentiates a certain size, shape, and color 
from other such configurations, which now serve as its 
background. It is important to note that the object 
seen and its background have the same ontological 
status for they are interchangeable; what is an object 
from one vantage point may serve as background for the 
next, as my focus expands or contracts. Thought for 
Merleau-Ponty is the attempt not only to join perspec-
tives to the world, as noted earlier, but also to con-
nect consciousness and world in a very fundamental 
manner; thought expresses the relationship between the 
visible object and the invisible background which 
together furnish consciousness with its basic sense of 
the world. The connection of perceiver to world accom-
plished by thought is no longer a private connection; 
thought is the prolongation of perception to include 
the objective structure of vision suppressed in im-
mediate perception. 
In their most basic form, thoughts are expressions 
of location, contrast, and intensity. Merleau-Ponty 
asserts that all relational knowledge, knowledge upon 
which more abstract accounts of the world rest, is gar-
nered from this network between figures, and between 
figure and background, which exists within the objec-
tive structure of vision. The contrasts between figure 
and background spawn our basic ideas of depth, quality 
and proportion. The contrasts between figures 
furnishes consciousness with its basic understanding of 
the use-value of objects.110] This can be seen anytime 
consciousness is presented with something foreign to 
its experience; consciousness1 first effort is to adapt 
the object to the situation in order to determine its 
use or meaning. 
Merleau-Ponty's description of experience contests 
the notion that cognition is entirely private. 
Thoughts or judgments are not a priori standards by 
which an indeterminate reality is measured, for the 
situation here is reversed; the basic categories of 
thought—quantity, quality, relation and modality—are 
presented by vision and modified through experience. 
The description of thought given by Merleau-Ponty 
points to an unconscious origin in the perceptual 
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world. At this level we are normally unaware of our 
use of thought; this level cannot, therefore, represent 
the highest level of cognition. The highest function 
is reserved for the self-conscious direction of thought 
by speech into a verbal thematization of the world; it 
is through speech that consciousness expresses its 
knowledge of itself and the world. Every thought ex-
pressed through speech is a verbal perspective on the 
world which completes the meaning of perception by 
detailing the thing seen, its background, and the 
relationship between the two. We must now discover how 
speech humanizes thought while also documenting the 
continued participation of speech in the 
intersubjective process of vision. 
Merleau-Ponty observes that the promotion of vision 
to speech is attended by problems which did not face 
thought. Where vision presents itself in a manner that 
demands very little of thought, speech is a more 
creative mode of cognition. If two perceivers are 
situated in the same room, while we may grant that the 
scene presented to each is identical, their expressions 
of the settings may well be completely different. 
Merleau-Ponty recognizes the differences between our 
verbal thematizations and yet does not feel that this 
difference jeopardizes his claim of a common origin for 
language. Speech, he notes originates as a private or 
egocentric language. However, while the means by which 
we speak is personal, that about which we speak is 
either a shared perceptual possession or an ex-
trapolation from such a perception. Speech arrays the 
world around the situation within the world which con-
sciousness occupies. Speech directs attention to some 
aspect of the world by exposing certain patterns which 
have caught its attention and, while it is true that 
the consciousness which speaks has a history and an in-
tentionality of its own, it is also true that the whole 
effort of speech or elocution aims at calling attention 
to some form of experience which has at its heart a 
relationship first suggested by the world; speech 
remains bound to the unconscious and objective struc-
ture of thought. 
Proof that egocentric language has an objective 
quality is provided by my verbal interaction with 
others. Merleau-Ponty observes that: 
. others present to me in their own fashion 
what will always be invisible to me, what I will 
never directly witness . . . a certain difference 
in terms of dimensions which are from the first 
common to us.Ill] 
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The other, who witnesses my understanding of the 
world from outside the flow of consciousness, reflects 
back to me aspects of my worldly incarnation which are 
opaque to me; the other shows me important aspects of 
my very nature of which I would otherwise be unaware. 
The speech of others also connects my world, the range 
of my vision, to the objective matrix which undergirds 
all consciousnesses. Let us examine the view of 
language which the completed circuit of vision— 
consciousness, object and other—presents. 
Egocentric speech is by itself the statement of 
consciousness1 understanding of its situation; its 
views are partial and its hold on the world is 
precarious. The speech of others is both informative 
and corrective. The differences between my expression 
and that of others is a difference in respect to the 
shared structure of the world. Language and com-
munication are a constant attempt by consciousnesses to 
express the meanings of the world which all have in 
common; communication is always held together by our 
mutual situation. Language is neither solipsistic, nor 
is it a synthesis of discrete thinking units. It is 
the constant attempt to clothe in human meaning a world 
of contrasts which first evoked thought; language has 
as its aim the narrowing of the gap between our seemin-
gly private perspectives on the world. the very 
project of communication seems to have as its aim the 
coincidence of consciousnesses with the objective 
world. 
Merleau-Ponty*s study of thought and speech drives 
solipsism from its final refuge, the sphere of 
cognition. Speech and thought are not entirely 
private, since each is but the internalization of the 
mute world which sustains both. The key to language is 
to be sought in consciousness1 participation in the 
world rather than in the sturcutre of formal grammar; 
language is constantly being modified as speech brings 
new facets of the world to light. 
In the final analysis, Merleau-Ponty shows solip-
sism to be a byproduct of philsoophical analysis, and 
not a paradox of experience itself. While there is a 
unique grasp of the world which is the birthright of 
each consciousness, it is also true that consciousness 
has an objective side; the world which structures 
consciousness and which is responsible for self-
awareness is a shared dimension. Philosophical solip-
sism arises when identification of self-awareness with 
cognition forces a rupture with the sensory world. 
The restoration of the world to its fullness 
provides an attractive alternative to the impasses 
presented by transcendental philosophy. By reconciling 
cognition with the sensory world Merleau-Ponty 
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eliminates the gap between reflection and that which is 
reflected upon, while still preserving the necessary 
distance between the world and consciousness required 
by thought; this distance is guaranteed through the 
receding character of vision, whereby perspectives 
never completely coincide with the world. 
Merleau-Ponty's extension of mind to include what 
is often and disparagingly referred to as the 'mundane' 
world offers two distinct advantages. First, in the 
area of epistemology, social theory, and political 
philosophy, it permits renewed investigation, unfet-
tered by the extremes of nominalism and realism. Words 
do not merely lend meaning to an inderterminate reality 
(nominalism), nor is the conceptual reality of language 
a transcendent realm, independent of discrete 
appearances; for Merleau-Ponty, the activity of naming 
opens a pathway to the always transcendent objective 
world within which the collective nature of mankind, 
class consciousness, and knowledge are to be found. 
The recovery of the worldly aspects of these notions 
could prove to be of vital importance to philosophy. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the model of 
the world provided Merleau-Ponty invites and demands 
validation at every level—perceptual, linguistic, and 
social. The objective world described is the same 
reality with which the psychologist, the linguist, the 
sociologist, and the scientist is concerned. Merleau-
Ponty 's preliminary sketch of the world is not limited 
to philosophical research; it allows confirmation, 
rejection, or modification by all ot the "sciences of 
man'. This willingness of Merleau-Ponty to open 
philosophy to the world is perhaps his most striking 
achievement. 
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NOTES 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible, trans, by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 8. 
2 
In effacement, the world retreats to ground and is 
superceded by the figure which captures the perceiver's 
attention. To borrow from the language of 
Phenomenology of Perception, the visible object becomes 
the figure and the world becomes the fond or worldly 
backdrop which sustains the appearance. 
3 . . In the first chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of conversion. He writes: "In other words, we are cat-ching sight of another operation besides the conversion to reflection, more fundamental than it . . . ." (p. 38) Perceptual conversion is this fundamental operation. If the perceiver enjoys direct access to the world, there can be no reflective consciousness in-tervening between the world and the perspective. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty explains that the process of vision is itself a conversion of the world into per-spectival patterns of meaning. The term conversion em-phasizes that the world and the perspective are not of two different orders, but rather that the perspective is the world converted into a form comprehensible to man's psychophysical constitution. 
4 
The term 'vision* refers to the entire perceptual 
process described in conversion; when speaking of the 
situated perceiver, the terras 'perception' or 
•perspectives' shall be employed. 
5The relationship of consciousness to world 
discussed here is drawn from Merleau-Ponty's analysis 
of Sartre's conception of consciousness as a noth-
ingness and Being as positivity, found in chaper two of 
The Visible and the Invisible. Merleau-Ponty first 
criticizes the shortcomings of Sartre's approach, and 
then adapts these concepts to the experience of vision. 
I have here adopted Merleau-Ponty's revision of Sartre 
since it allows a clear contrast to the traditional 
doctrines of consciousness and world. Later in The 
Visible and the Invisible these concepts (which are 
working tools at best) are replaced by a model of Being 
which surpasses the logical dilemmas of being and 
nothingness. For our purposes, however, these 
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preliminary terms present a clearer model of Merleau-Ponty 's approach to solipsism. 
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 
'ibid., p. 58, my insertion. 
g 
Ibid., p. 63, my insertions. 
q 
Communication here refers to the network of 
meaning which holds between thinking and speaking 
subjects. The relation of communication to one's 
thoughts and speech is parallel to the relation of 
vision to perception discussed earlier. Language for 
Merleau-Ponty is interchangeable with communication. 
1 0The contrast between figures is sustained by the 
continuous fabric of perception through which percep-
tual structures are alternately figures and reliefs. 
The contrasts between figures are an index first esta-
blished by the perceiver and hence appears, at first 
glance, not to be a natural relation. However, as we 
shall see, this relationship between firgures is by no 
means a reflective reconstruction, since the meaning 
which obtains between figures remains bound to the per-
ceptual setting from which they arise. Thus, claims 
Merleau-Ponty, even man-made relations are sustained by 
the perceptual world, a view which has an important 
role to play in his model of communication. 
^Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 
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